Frankfurt’s Account of Freedom of the Will

Frankfurt’s account regarding the personal concept of the freedom of the will defines clearly what is the morally and ethical grounds to be considered in analyzing one’s actions and thinking. In his account, he explicitly stated that personal freedom of will is concept of expression for a sensible and logical person in doing and thinking things in accordance to his or her personal aims or desires. He explicitly denounce that one’s freedom of will is actually the manifestation of his or her effective desires whether in aspects of actions or logical thinking.

In his opinion, Frankfurt expressed his personal definition of one’s effective desires, which is that it is the concept or idea that certain person chooses to enact in accordance to his personal logic and morals in pursuit of its effects and impacts on his or her personal life. Considering this idea, it is a logical concept that people can either accept or deny the physical enactment of one’s idea of actions thus the actions that a logical and sensible person chooses are the things that are called effective desires.

In considering an addict’s freedom of will, Frankfurt explicitly presented rejection of the said concept. According to his opinion, personal freedom of will has the following components that are actually violated in the concept of an addict’s will. Freedom of will is encompassing the components of the orders of the desires regarding their priority degree and the application of the idea of freedom without any outside factors influencing the person’s decision. In the idea of addiction, one’s logicality and sensibility are actually being influence by the effects and the satisfaction aspects of the desired concepts, thus this factors generally corrupts one’s decision of exercising his or her freedom. In humanistic perspective, it can be viewed that the addicted person is already desiring other things on top of his addicted exercise however the addictive factors of that exercise or object is overwhelming that person’s willful desire thus producing a violation of the components of one’s freedom such as the order of desire and the principles of freedom from influences. Because of which, the idea of Frankfurt of denying the substantiality of the concept of the freedom of will of an addict becomes justifiable in accordance to the principles of one’s freedom of willful desire.